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Pre-dispute arbitration agreements in employment have the potential to revolutionize
employment law. Between the years 1990 to 1998, the number of civil rights-based employment
actions filed in federal court against private companies almost tripled from 8,413 in 1990 to
23,735 in 1998.1 Employment battles are often hard-fought. Approximately one-third of the
federal employment cases were tried in 1998; that percentage has since progressively decreased.2
Many employees never get to trial. They are denied justice at the outset because of their
inability to afford counsel. Employees who opt to represent themselves are at an obvious
disadvantage. If they are able to retain counsel, employees rarely go to trial, and—when they
do—only 35.5% obtain favorable outcomes.3
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As these statistics suggest, employers fare better in federal court in terms of favorable
outcomes. However, they achieve success at considerable cost. Defense costs and fees average
in excess of $100,000 if a case is tried. When coupled with the expenses associated with actual
trial losses, most employers have difficulty shouldering their burden. In 1998, the median
damage award in jury cases was $137,000.4 In particular, 14.2% of the cases tried in 1998
resulted in jury awards of more than $1 million; in 10.6% of the cases, the jury awards that year
exceeded $10 million.5 In addition to actual damages, employers are subject to pre- and postjudgment interest, compensatory damages and, in cases of intentional or reckless misconduct,
punitive or liquidated damages. Attorneys’ fees and costs may double when the employee
prevails, since employers then face paying the plaintiff’s statutory fees and costs in addition to
their own.6
Against this backdrop, in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,7 the United States Supreme
Court endorsed the broad enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in employment
agreements.8 From a policy perspective, this endorsement was not surprising. Clearly, the
widespread arbitration of employment disputes promises to significantly reduce civil filings in
federal court and, at the same time, provide a cost-effective alternative to litigation in resolving
employment disputes. Why, then, do employers and employees alike resist the urge to arbitrate
such disputes?
This article defines the permissible scope of arbitration agreements in employment and
explores avenues to insure that both parties to the employment relationship view arbitration as a
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viable, cost-effective means to resolve employment disputes. It also proposes a model for district
courts to use in referring employment disputes to arbitration. That model is based on the parties’
pre- and post-dispute agreements to arbitrate and allows for the reformation of pre-dispute
agreements that violate principles of basic fairness and mutuality. Court-sanctioned binding
arbitration would reduce the court’s civil docket and resolve employment disputes on a costeffective basis without threatening plaintiffs’ statutory remedies or fundamental notions of due
process.

Part I: Circuit City and Its Progeny: Judicial Endorsement of Pre-Dispute Arbitration
Agreements in Employment
Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to quell judicial hostility toward
arbitration agreements.9 In the early years following enactment, the Supreme Court endorsed
Congress’s intent to “place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts”10
and consistently upheld written arbitration agreements in the commercial context.11
The FAA’s purpose is unmistakably commercial.12 More specifically, Section 2 of the
Act provides that a written agreement to arbitrate “any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce … shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”13 Less
clear—at least from the statutory language—is whether the FAA governs employment-related
agreements to arbitrate.
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Section 1 of the Act provides that “nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce.”14 Until the Supreme Court decision in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams,15 courts struggled to determine whether Section 1 broadly excluded all types of
employment agreements from the FAA’s reach.16 Circuit City resolved this issue, holding that
Section 1 refers only to employment contracts of transportation workers directly engaged in
commerce.17 Stated differently, the Supreme Court narrowly construed Section 1’s proscription
to allow for arbitration clauses in all other types of employment agreements.
Since Circuit City, lower courts continue to struggle with enforcement issues in the
employment context where parties enter into an agreement to arbitrate as a condition of
employment.18 This struggle involves the tension between the courts’ desire to protect
employees’ statutory rights, while permitting employers to regulate their workplace with minimal
judicial intervention.
Employers increasingly seek pre-dispute binding arbitration agreements to avoid the costs
and expenses associated with litigation. However, most employees view arbitration agreements
with disdain, as negatively impacting their statutory rights to attorney’s fees and compensatory
and punitive damages under the anti-discrimination laws. As a result, instead of viewing
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arbitration as an opportunity to swiftly resolve their client’s dispute, employees’ counsel often
challenge arbitration agreements on the grounds of lack of mutual obligation, coercion, or
interference with statutory rights. Many of these concerns would be alleviated with well-drafted
arbitration agreements and through adoption of procedural safeguards in the arbitration process
itself.

A. Pre-Circuit City Arbitration Decisions
The Supreme Court first addressed the interplay of anti-discrimination statutes and the
FAA in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation.19 Employee Robert Gilmer filed suit in
district court claiming that he was discharged in violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA).20 However, because Gilmer agreed to a pre-dispute arbitration
provision as part of his broker registration application, the Supreme Court compelled
arbitration.21 In doing so, the Court reaffirmed its position that “by agreeing to arbitrate a
statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only
submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”22
The Gilmer Court reasoned that Supreme Court precedent endorsed the arbitration of
other federal statutory claims.23 and that nothing in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
or its legislative history precluded the arbitration of age claims.24 It further rejected any
“generalized attacks” against the adequacy of arbitration procedures, such as the ability to retain
impartial arbitrators, limited discovery procedures, restricted types of relief, or whether a written
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opinion would be issued.25 Instead, the Court emphasized that the “FAA’s purpose was to place
arbitration agreements on the same footing as other contract.”26 However, because the arbitration
agreement at issue was contained in a broker registration application and not with Gilmer’s
employer, the Court failed to address the FAA’s scope in relation to individual employment
contracts.27
Thus, Gilmer provided limited guidance on how to apply the FAA’s Section 1
exemptions to employment contracts. Some post-Gilmer courts construed Section 1 broadly to
exclude the arbitration of all employment disputes from the FAA’s reach,28 while others excluded
only the arbitration of employment agreements related to transportation workers.29 Again, the
Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Circuit City construed Section 1 narrowly to exclude
only employment contracts related to transportation workers directly engaged in commerce.30

B. Circuit City and the Wrinkle of EEOC v. Waffle House
By virtue of their signed employment applications, Circuit City employees agreed to
arbitrate any dispute arising out of their application for employment, employment and/or
termination of employment, including claims under the federal anti-discrimination laws.31
Accordingly, when employee Saint Clair Adams filed an employment discrimination suit, the
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district court granted Circuit City’s motion to compel arbitration.32 The Ninth Circuit reversed,
reasoning that Section 1 of the FAA excluded mandatory arbitration.33 The Supreme Court
disagreed, limiting Section 1’s exemptions to transportation workers..34
In reaching it conclusion, the Circuit City Court rejected the argument that an
employment contract was not “a contract evidencing a transaction involving interstate
commerce,” and that Section 2 of the FAA extended only to commercial contracts.35 According
to the Court, this interpretation “would make the section 1 exclusion provision superfluous.”36 In
addition, it would be inconsistent with Gilmer, where arbitration of the employee’s ADEA claim
was compelled under a broker registration application, not a commercial contract.37 The Court
also restated its earlier determination that the FAA pre-empts state law.38
Less than a year after Circuit City, the Supreme Court declined to expand the scope of the
FAA in EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.39 There, the Court held that non-party public agencies are
not bound by arbitration agreements arising out of the employment relationship.40
The facts in Waffle House limit its reach. More specifically, Waffle House required its
employees to sign pre-dispute arbitration agreements as a condition of employment. The
company discharged Eric Baker shortly after he suffered a seizure at work.41 Baker filed a
discrimination charge with Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), challenging
his discharge as a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act.42 The Fourth Circuit held that
the EEOC could pursue an enforcement action on behalf of Baker and the public interest, despite
32
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Baker’s pre-dispute arbitration agreement, since the EEOC was not a party to the agreement.
However, the court limited the agency’s remedies to injunctive relief.43
The Supreme Court disagreed with this remedial limitation, noting that the FAA is
designed to enforce private agreements and not to restrict a non-party’s choice of forum.44 The
Court, thus, held that the EEOC could pursue a court action with victim-specific relief, including
backpay, reinstatement, compensatory damages for pain and suffering and punitive damages for
malicious and reckless conduct.45
In theory, Waffle House creates a significant wrinkle in an employer’s ability to preclude
employment discrimination suits through pre-dispute arbitration agreements. In practice, Waffle
House presents little impediment to employers seeking to resolve employment matters through
arbitration. The EEOC files less than two percent (2%) of all anti-discrimination claims in
federal court. That percentage only slightly increases (to close to 5%) in cases where the agency
found reasonable cause following investigation.46 Indeed, the Waffle House Court relied on these
and other statistics to assert that “… permitting the EEOC access to victim-specific relief in cases
where the employee has agreed to binding arbitration, … will have a negligible effect on the
federal policy favoring arbitration.”47
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C. Post-Waffle House Lower Court Decisions
1. Cost- Splitting Provisions as a Threat to Enforcement
More threatening to arbitration finality than Waffle House are cases which refuse to
enforce agreements that mandate that each party pay half the costs of arbitration48 or their own
attorney’s fees.49 Historically, several courts found cost-splitting provisions to be unenforceable
per se.50 The Supreme Court decision in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph51 changed this
tide. Since Green Tree, most courts address the issue of cost-splitting on a case-by-case basis to
determine whether the potential cost of arbitration actually restricts an individual’s access to the
arbitral forum.52 Rather than void the entire arbitration agreement if the cost provision is
prohibitive, the trend is to sever the offensive provision and compel arbitration under the balance
of the agreement.53
The Green Tree Court endorsed this case-by-case approach, refusing to void arbitration
agreements silent on the issue of costs and fees as unenforceable per se.54 While the Court
recognized that “large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant … from effectively vindicating
her statutory rights in the arbitral forum,” it held that the party challenging the agreement must
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show that the cost of arbitration is prohibitive.55 The Court criticized the plaintiff’s reliance on
American Arbitration Association (AAA) cost estimates as “too speculative” to support her
contention that costs precluded her from pursuing arbitration.56 Unfortunately, the Green Tree
Court failed to offer more guidance on the type of evidence needed to show that arbitration is
cost-prohibitive.57 This void has been filled, in part, by a handful of Circuits considering the
issue. The post-Green Tree courts have proposed various benchmarks for enforcement of costsplitting provisions in employment arbitration agreements.58
For example, in Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc.59 the Fourth Circuit
posited that:
“… the appropriate inquiry is one that evaluates whether the arbitral forum
in a particular case is an adequate and accessible substitute to litigation,
i.e., a case-by-case analysis that focuses, among other things, upon the
claimant’s ability to pay the arbitration fees and costs, the expected cost
differential between arbitration and litigation in court, and whether that
cost differential is so substantial as to deter the bringing of claims.” 60
At least one problem with this approach exists where the plaintiff cannot produce a
concrete estimate of arbitration costs during the initial stages of the proceeding. Under these
circumstances, the court may prematurely determine that characterizing arbitration as costprohibitive is “too speculative.”61 To avoid this problem, the Third Circuit has suggested that
limited discovery identifying the arbitrator and approximating the length of the proceedings may
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allow for a more accurate estimate of actual arbitration costs and the claimant’s ability to pay for
them.62
The Sixth Circuit has taken the cost-splitting inquiry one step farther. Recognizing that
the federal discrimination laws protect individual rights as well as a “broader social purpose,” the
Sixth Circuit has held that “[a] cost-splitting provision should be held unenforceable whenever it
would have the ‘chilling effect’ of deterring a substantial number of potential litigants from
seeking to vindicate their statutory rights.” 63 According to the Sixth Circuit, arbitration is costprohibitive when “similarly situated individuals” would forgo claims against an employer based
on the likelihood of substantial arbitration costs.64 Thus, in Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.,
the Sixth Circuit considered this deterrent effect in terms of a former employee’s financial
instability in determining whether to pursue arbitration where the risks of expending “scarce
resources” would reap “uncertain benefit[s].”65 This approach involves an expansive reading of
Green Tree, since the Green Tree holding only considered whether arbitration is cost-prohibitive
to the individual plaintiff.66
A number of courts have opted to sever illegal cost-splitting provisions from arbitration
agreements rather than void the entire agreement.67 In Spinetti v. Service Corporation
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International,68 the Third Circuit affirmed severance of a cost-splitting provision that required
“each party to pay its own costs and attorney’s fees, regardless of the outcome of the arbitration,”
as well as one-half of the arbitrator’s fees and other arbitration costs.69 As a result, the court
compelled arbitration under the balance of the agreement.70 The Spinetti Court also found that,
implicit in the district court’s decision to sever, was a finding that the employer bear the
responsibility for all arbitration costs; by contrast, the issue of attorney’s fees was governed by
the statutory fee-shifting provision.71

2. Limitation of Remedies Further Threaten Enforcement
The Spinetti court further identified a “tension” between two public policy concerns: the
federal policy favoring arbitration and the policy ensuring that claimants effectively vindicate
their statutory rights through the arbitral forum.72 Where an arbitration agreement infringes on a
plaintiff’s statutory rights by restricting the amount or type of remedy to which a plaintiff is
otherwise entitled, courts do not hesitate to sever the remedial provision,73 and sometimes even
void the entire agreement.74 In McCaskill v. SCI Management Corporation, 75 the Seventh
Circuit opted to void a pre-dispute arbitration agreement which contemplated the arbitration of
all employment disputes without the recovery of attorney’s fees. Notwithstanding the agreement,
McCaskill filed a Title VII lawsuit arguing that the agreement was void and unenforceable,
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because it required each party to pay its own attorney’s fees.76 Stated differently, McCaskill
sought to void the agreement on the basis that the attorneys’ fee provision precluded her from
vindicating her Title VII right to attorney’s fees as a prevailing plaintiff.77 In an earlier opinion
in the case, the Seventh Circuit agreed that a plaintiff’s “statutory right to attorney’s fees … is
essential to fulfill the remedial and deterrent functions of Title VII.”78 It, thus, determined that
the entire agreement was unenforceable. 79 Severing the offensive provision was never raised as
an option.80
In Spinetti, the Third Circuit severed the same fee provision presented in McCaskill.81
The court explained that it reached a different result based on the parties’ arguments. Severance
was never raised in McCaskill; by contrast, it was the “main issue” before the Spinetti court.82
The Third Circuit first considered whether Spinetti’s arbitration agreement was valid under state
law. Pennsylvania law provides that where an “essential” contract term is illegal, the entire
contract is unenforceable.83 The court found that the agreement’s purpose was to resolve
employment disputes and “not to regulate costs or attorney’s fees.”84 Partial enforcement of the
agreement was, therefore, proper. Indeed, the court could remove the illegal terms and modify
the arbitration provision if equity so required.85
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Finally, in Spinetti, the Third Circuit rejected the EEOC’s position that “the employer
should not have the benefit of a sanitized arbitration procedure stripped of the improper attorney
fees and arbitration costs clauses” which would deter employees from seeking relief under
arbitration agreements.86 The court found that such argument would, in fact, ultimately compel
employees to seek judicial resolution, along with the burdens and fees associated with litigation.
It also found that the EEOC’s position was against the federal policy favoring arbitration. The
court concluded that, “the increasing awareness by claimants’ counsel of their severability will, at
least, ensure that employees who inquire about remedies will be given appropriate advice by
counsel.”87
The Sixth Circuit also will sever—rather than void—arbitration agreements that limit
front pay and punitive damages, as well as other remedies available to prevailing Title VII
plaintiffs.88 In Morrison v. Circuit City, the Sixth Circuit consolidated two cases challenging the
validity of an arbitration agreement under Title VII, in an en banc review.89 In the first case,
Morrison signed an arbitration clause as part of her application for a managerial position with
Circuit City.90 Morrison alleged that she was terminated because of race and sex discrimination
and subsequently filed suit in district court. Circuit City’s motion to compel arbitration was
granted, and Morrison appealed.91
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Circuit City adopted specific “Rules and Procedures” to govern the arbitration of
employment disputes, including an intricate cost-splitting provision under which the
claimant/employee was required to pay the initial $75 filing fee and Circuit City would advance
subsequent arbitration costs. Absent an award of costs to the prevailing party, the employee was
required to pay one-half of the final arbitration costs within ninety days of the arbitration
award.92 In addition, each party was responsible for its own attorney’s fees, subject to the
arbitrator’s discretion.
The rules also outlined discovery procedures and available remedies, including injunctive
relief, back pay, front pay, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and a limited amount of
monetary damages.93 The Morrison court found that the remedies provision undermined the
remedial and deterrent purposes of Title VII, and that the cost-splitting provision would likely
deter potential litigants from pursuing grievances due to the potential cost of arbitration. Thus, it
was appropriate for the court to sever the offensive provisions and enforce the balance of the
agreement.94
In the second Morrison case, Mark F. Shankle agreed to binding arbitration as a condition
of his employment with Pep Boys. Shankle’s agreement stated that arbitrations held there under
would follow the Model Employment Arbitration Procedures of the American Arbitration
Association (AAA), “except as provided in this agreement.”95 The agreement further provided
that arbitrators would be selected from a list of eleven arbitrators presented by the AAA, and that
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additional lists would be provided if the parties did not agree on a common person.96 The
arbitrator’s fee was to be split between the employee and the company, with each party bearing
his or her other costs and attorney’s fees, unless the arbitrator awarded fees to the prevailing
party.97
When Shankle sought severance pay following his resignation from Pep Boys, he was
informed that the parties’ prior agreement required that the claim be arbitrated. Although
Shankle initiated arbitration, under the advice of new counsel, he tried to withdraw therefrom and
sue Pep Boys in federal court for alleged violations of Title VII. The district court granted
Shankle’s motion to stay arbitration and held that the agreement’s cost-splitting provision was
unenforceable. Concerned with discrepancies between the procedures stated in the company’s
arbitration agreement and those followed by the AAA, the district court struck the remainder of
the agreement as unenforceable, finding “no meeting of the minds as to the procedures to be
followed during the arbitration.”98 The Sixth Circuit acknowledged significant discrepancies
between the agreement procedures and those followed by AAA. Nevertheless, the court elected
not to void the entire agreement. Instead, it compelled arbitration under the agreement’s
supremacy clause.99

3. The New Wrinkle: Are Class Actions Permitted in Arbitration, and Who
Decides this Issue?

96

Id.
Id. at 657.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 680.
97

16

Until recently, the concepts of arbitration and classwide relief were considered by most to
be mutually exclusive.100 That changed with the recent Supreme Court decision in Green Tree
Financial Corporation v. Bazzle.101 In a plurality opinion authored by Justice Breyer, the court
held that an arbitrator should decide whether the underlying agreements forbid class arbitrations
where they were silent on the subject.102 The court, thus, rejected caselaw which upheld the
judicial authority to direct class-wide arbitrations and vacated a judgment entered by the South
Carolina Supreme Court.103
Bazzle involved two cases and two financing agreements with Green Tree Financial.
Both agreements contained clauses requiring the arbitration of all contract-related disputes. In
the first case, Lynn and Burt Bazzle sued Green Tree in state court, claiming that their standard
financing agreement for home improvements violated South Carolina law by failing to provide
them with a legally required form advising them of their right to select their own attorney and
insurance agent.104 The Bazzles amended their complaint to include class allegations and moved
for class certification. Green Tree moved to stay the court action and to compel arbitration based
on the parties’ agreement. The state court certified a class and compelled class-wide arbitration.
Similarly, Daniel Lackey and George and Florine Buggs sued Green Tree for failing to
allow for attorney and insurance agent preferences in their finance agreements to purchase
mobile homes. Lackey sought class certification, and Green Tree sought arbitration. After an
appellate court found the arbitration clause to be enforceable, the parties consented to arbitration
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before the same arbitrator appointed to handle the Bazzles’dispute.105 The arbitrator certified a
class over Green Tree’s objection.
Both the Bazzle and Lackey arbitrations resulted in multi-million dollar class awards,
including attorneys’ fees and costs, based on the arbitrator’s finding that the financing
agreements violated South Carolina’s consumer protection law.106 The trial court confirmed both
awards, denying Green Tree’s motions to vacate. Green Tree appealed, claiming that class
arbitration was legally impermissible under its financing agreements.
The South Carolina Supreme Court withdrew both cases from the appeals court to assume
jurisdiction over a consolidated appeal. It noted that where the parties’ agreement is silent on the
subject of class arbitration, South Carolina will construe this “ambiguity” against the drafting
party. Accordingly, the court held that state law interpreted silent agreements as permitting class
arbitrations.107 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether this
holding was consistent with the FAA, but never reached this question.108 Instead, the Court
remanded the case to the arbitrator to decide whether the agreement language allowed for class
arbitration.
The plurality considered this issue to be one of contract interpretation and, thus, within
the arbitrator’s purview.109 The court explained that the agreement language was ambiguous and
that any doubts about the scope of arbitration should be resolved in favor of arbitration.110
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The plurality further distinguished the issue of class arbitrability from other “gateway matters”
decided by the courts, including whether the parties agreed to arbitration and “whether a
concedely binding arbitration clause applies to a certain type of controversy.”111
Without question, the availability of class arbitration could be deemed a “gateway matter”
of the latter variety. By characterizing the issue as one of contract interpretation and not
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court expanded the arbitrator’s role beyond the four corners of the
contract. It justified this result by framing the relevant question in terms of “the kind of
arbitration proceeding the parties agreed to.”112 According to the Court, that question concerned
neither a state statute nor judicial procedures. Under these circumstances, an arbitrator was
deemed “well-suited” to decide the question.113
Chief Justice Rehnquist argued in his dissent that the issue of class-wide arbitration
should be left to the courts, since it is “more akin” to questions of “what shall be arbitrated,”
which are decided by courts and not arbitrators.114 Justices Kennedy and O’Connor joined in the
dissent. They interpreted the underlying agreements to limit arbitration to the contracting
parties.115 In their view, Green Tree was denied its right to select an arbitrator for each dispute
when—in a class context—the same arbitrator was imposed to resolve multiple claims.116
Although Green Tree was not an employment case, its language is broad enough to
impact employment arbitrations. Still unclear is the extent to which courts will endorse contract
provisions which ban class arbitrations. Such clauses have been voided as against public policy
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under California law.117 Bazzle did not address this issue, since its holding was prescribed by
the contract language. Indeed, a broader holding would have mandated that the class arbitration
issue be decided by a court as a matter of jurisdiction.118
The Supreme Court’s obvious split on the issue of class arbitrations raises these and other
policy concerns. There is also the danger of inconsistent opinions if arbitrators decide whether to
allow a matter to proceed to class arbitration. This danger is underscored by the fact that
arbitration decisions are without precedential value.119 To avoid uncertainty, arbitration clauses
must address the issue of whether class arbitration is contemplated and who will determine any
ambiguities concerning arbitrability.

Part II: Ensuring Fundamental Fairness: Drafting Implications for Arbitration
Agreements and Other Procedural Safeguards
The increasing use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in employment agreements has the
potential to significantly reduce civil filings in federal courts while, at the same time, providing a
cost-effective alternative to litigation.120 Employers generally recognize the cost benefits of
arbitration. Employees, by contrast, are afraid to waive their right to a judicial forum and seek
assurances for the protection of their legal and statutory rights. But this fear is often unfounded.
It assumes biased arbitrators and that arbitration costs will exceed litigation expenses based on
unfair comparisons. Rarely do these comparisons consider protracted discovery expenses unique
to litigation or the fact that plaintiff’s employment lawyers typically charge litigation retainers
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and, increasingly, reduced hourly rates.121 Instead, they compare filing fees among the various
forums without regard to the additional expenses associated with jury demands or the fact the
employers are likely to cover the arbitration fees in light of recurring enforcement problems that
result when the employee is forced to bear costs.122 When more realistic comparisons are
employed, arbitration emerges as a prompt and economical alternative to the litigation of
employment disputes.
There is also evidence to suggest that employees more often prevail before an arbitrator
than in court, although their awards may be less in arbitration.123 Awards may be “evened out”
through remedial provisions in arbitration agreements that allow employees to recover all
statutory remedies in the arbitral forum. To insure full relief and that arbitration is generally
viable, a well-drafted agreement is critical. This will help to ensure due process, protect
employee rights and alleviate employee concerns that arbitrations favor employers.

A.

Contract & Drafting Implications to Ensure Substantive Due Process

Drafting an effective arbitration agreement begins by adhering to the basic contract
principles of offer, acceptance and consideration. The language of an arbitration agreement
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should clearly express the parties’ intent to resolve disputes through binding arbitration rather
than through a judicial forum.
There is a presumption that signed employment applications or employment agreements,
including contracts of adhesion, are voluntary.124 Courts have stricken only a handful of
agreements as unconscionable, where the agreement is uneven.125 Thus, an agreement was
stricken which unilaterally required employees to arbitrate without creating a corresponding
obligation on the employer. Agreements which give employers exclusive control over the pool
of potential arbitrators will, likewise, be stricken as violating basic notions of due process.126 By
contrast, where the agreement is supported by consideration, and the employer is equally
obligated to arbitrate employment-related disputes, the arbitration agreement will withstand
arguments that it is against public policy or unconscionable.127
The more common threat to enforcement and a principal concern of employee advocates
lies in provisions that compromise an employee’s statutory remedies or legal rights. Green Tree
and its progeny stand for the proposition that courts may sever clauses that render arbitration
cost-prohibitive or otherwise limit employee remedies.128 Even class actions may be pursued in
arbitral and judicial forums.129 The ultimate question is how far courts should go in reforming
agreements that are silent on critical issues or lack mutuality.

124

See, e.g., Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33 (“Mere inequality in bargaining power, however, is not a sufficient reason to
hold that arbitration agreements are never enforceable in the employment context”).
125
See, e.g., Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1173–74 (finding that the arbitration agreement was one-sided because it “essentially
cover[ed] only claims that at employees would likely bring against [the employer],” but not claims that the employer
might bring against employees).
126
See McMullen v. Meijer, Inc., 337 F.3d 697, 703–05 (6th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (finding the arbitrator-selection
process fundamentally unfair.)
127
See, e.g., Morrison, 317 F.3d at 668 (plaintiff “knowing and voluntarily waived her right to pursue her
employment claims in federal court” considering the fact that she was highly educated, the waiver to file suit in court
was clear, and applicants had three days to withdraw their consent); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Ahmed, 283 F. 3d
1198 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that an arbitration agreement was not procedurally unconscionable where employee
had the opportunity to opt out of program implementing binding arbitration, but did not do so).
128
Green Tree, 531 U.S. 79; See also Spinetti, 324 F.3d at 219–20.
129
See Bazzle, 123 S.Ct. at 2407.
22

When drafting arbitration agreements, employers must consider whether to exclude costsplitting provisions altogether or limit their scope to those cases in which the recovery of costs
and fees will not effectively deny employees their right to representation. Arbitrators determine
whether cost-splitting is prohibitive, based on a number of factors, including: whether the
employee is currently employed; the identity of, and fees associated with the arbitrator presiding
over the dispute; and the cost of initial filing fees.130 The arbitrator also may request additional
discovery to decide whether particular any cost-splitting measures are deserving of
enforcement.131
Alternatively, the arbitration agreement may exclude cost-splitting provisions. The
presumption here is that the employer will bear the cost of arbitration.132 The agreement also
may state that the employer bears all costs. But even in this scenario, the employer comes out
ahead, since the cost of arbitration is significantly less than the cost of protracted litigation.133
To eliminate any perceived bias that the arbitrator favors the party who pays, the arbitrator’s fees
should be paid through the entity administrating the arbitration and not directly to the
arbitrator.134 To alleviate concerns of unconscionability, the cost provisions must be clearly
spelled out.
Although courts often sever provisions that limit statutory remedies, it is not in the
employer’s best interest to include provisions likely to threaten enforcement. By doing so, the
advantages of arbitration are diminished or lost, as parties waste time and resources challenging
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or defending offensive provisions. The wiser course is to design agreements that expressly
protect employees’ statutory rights and provide the same remedies as are available in law or
equity.135
For example, arbitration agreements should acknowledge an employee’s right to counsel
and encourage the employee to review the agreement with counsel before signing it.136 Because
it is in the employer’s interest to expedite hiring and other employment decisions, the agreement
should set a reasonable review period (such as five business days) before the employment offer is
withdrawn. Where the agreement to arbitrate is part of an employment application, the employer
should provide an opt-out period of at least three days.137

B.

Due Process Safeguards

Procedural safeguards are integral to the successful arbitration of employment disputes
and to quell employee perceptions that arbitrations favor employers. Arbitration agreements
should, therefore, provide that the parties jointly select the arbitrator, define the types of disputes
to be arbitrated, and establish available remedies. Where the arbitration agreement and
proceedings comport with due process requirements, employees need not fear any compromise of
their legal rights.
Perhaps, the most significant distinction between arbitral and judicial forums is the right
to jury trial. At least in the context of employment discrimination, employees who pursue
arbitration waive their right to present their claims to a jury. The absence of procedural checks
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and balances further distinguishes the two types of forums. Arbitration decisions are not
disturbed except for abuses of discretion.138
Ironically, the advantages of arbitration are realized, in part, through diminished
procedural safeguards. Arbitration is more expedient and cost-effective than litigation, because
the process is streamlined and the arbitration decision is final and binding. A compromise
position assuages employee concerns by establishing minimum procedural safeguards in the
arbitral process.139 These minimum safeguards may include:
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C

A neutral arbitrator with expertise in employment issues, particularly statutory antidiscrimination claims;
Employer and employee participation in selecting the arbitrator;
Limited pre-trial discovery methods to obtain relevant information, yet designed to curb
discovery abuse;
Application of the Federal Rules of Evidence;
Right to representation by counsel;
Arbitrator discretion of cost allocation;
Arbitrator authority to award remedies available at law and in equity; and
Issuance of a written opinion.

A practical impediment to the arbitration of employment disputes arises in the limited
pool of available arbitrators with expertise in employment law.140 Arbitration has thrived in the
traditional labor context, since collective bargaining agreements typically include arbitration
provisions as the final step in a grievance process.141 Labor arbitrators, adept at contract
interpretation in a union setting, often have little or no experience in matters of statutory
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interpretation arising under anti-discrimination laws.142 Through training, arbitrators may be
educated about substantive, procedural and remedial issues related to anti-discrimination statutes
as well as general issues otherwise arising out of the employment relationship. 143
Neutrality furthers the interests of both parties by helping to ensure the finality of binding
arbitration. An arbitrator must disclose financial or other interests that may result in a conflict of
interest, any previous relationship with the party, or personal knowledge concerning the dispute,
so that parties may make an informed decision.144 Both employer and employee should
participate in selection of the arbitrator. For example, the agency presiding over the arbitration
can give the parties a list of arbitrators, including their experience and other information to
identify potential conflicts of interest. Parties may choose an arbitrator from this list by
agreement or process of elimination.145
To the extent the agreement is silent on the topic of fees and costs, it must afford the
arbitrator with the discretion to allocate costs and fees between the parties and to award remedies
available in law and in equity. The arbitrator should reduce his or her opinion to writing and
allow for limited discovery to allow employees to obtain information relevant to their claims.146
Such safeguards help assure that employees’ due process rights are protected.
In Gilmer, the Supreme Court recognized that the arbitration discovery procedures were
more limited than in the federal courts, but that “by agreeing to arbitrate, a party trades the
procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and
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expedition of arbitration.”147 The Court also found that the NYSE discovery provisions, which
allowed for document production, information requests, depositions and subpoenas, where
sufficient.148 Whether the procedures are promulgated by the employer in the arbitration
agreement or by the agency presiding over the dispute, the rules should encourage the arbitrator
to permit broader discovery, if necessary.149
Additional safeguards may include limitations on the use of hearsay to insure that
arbitration testimony has certain minimal indicia of reliability. Current arbitration practice
allows for the admission of hearsay, as long as the opponent is afforded the opportunity to crossexamine the hearsay declarant.

Part III: Proposal
The idea of less formal and more expedited methods of dispute resolution to relieve the
burdened judicial system has been a topic of debate since the 1970s.150 In 1998, Congress
enacted the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act,151 endorsing ADR programs as a means to
provide “innovative methods of resolving disputes, and greater efficiency in achieving
settlements,” as well as reduce federal judicial backlog. Section 652 of the Act states that “each
district court shall … require that litigants in all civil cases consider the use of an alternative
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dispute resolution process at an appropriate state in the litigation,152 and Section 654 specifically
provides for arbitration where appropriate.153
Despite widespread endorsement, the potential for alternative dispute resolution to
revolutionize employment law is far from realized. Linking arbitration to the judicial system
would help parties feel more comfortable with arbitration, rather than considering it a secondary
alternative to litigation. And by targeting cases that are ripe for settlement, court-facilitated
arbitration would alleviate judicial backlog and filings.154
As a practical matter, the initial inquiry into whether court-facilitated arbitration is
appropriate should begin when a complaint is filed. The parties would be requested to complete
a questionnaire at the outset of litigation to identify disputes that are ripe for arbitration. To
determine whether arbitration is compelled under a pre-dispute agreement, the questionnaire
would seek information as to whether the parties entered into an employment agreement with a
mandatory arbitration clause and, if so, the terms of that clause. Where an agreement to arbitrate
exists, the court should dismiss the litigation if the arbitration is to be final and binding unless
provisions for cost-splitting or limitation of remedies threaten enforcement.
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Where enforcement of a pre-dispute clause is questionable because of remedial or costsplitting provisions, the court may reform the agreement to allow for arbitration under
circumstances that will comport with notions of fundamental fairness and insure that prevailing
plaintiffs secure their statutory remedies. To the extent that the parties dispute whether the
arbitration clause is itself enforceable, the court may resolve the issue early on through a petition
for declaratory relief and avoid needless litigation in the process.
Even where the parties failed to provide for arbitration on a pre-dispute basis, a courtendorsed questionnaire could explore whether the parties are currently interested in pursuing
arbitration as an alternative to litigation. Such post-dispute arbitration would be particularly
appropriate in situations where there is a pro se litigant, a small amount in controversy, or a
continued relationship between the parties. Other considerations favoring arbitration would
include: time constraints, the failing health of parties or key witnesses, and the parties’ ability or
inability to pay for litigation. The court could dismiss the claims at its initial hearing if the
parties agreed to submit their dispute to binding arbitration. A consent form signed by the
parties, similar to that used to refer matters to a magistrate judge, could allow for post-dispute
arbitration and memorialize the agreement to do so. Due process safeguards should be insured in
any post-dispute agreement to arbitrate.

Conclusion
While arbitration is not a panacea for problems that plague the judicial system, it may
alleviate those problems and emerge as a cost-effective option to the litigation of employment
disputes. Courts continue to flush out enforcement issues related to unconscionability, feeshifting, statutory remedies and procedural issues, including class actions. Within these
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boundaries, the possibilities for arbitration are limited only by the terms of the parties’ agreement
and concepts of fundamental fairness.
Under the proposed model, courts would insure that the letter and spirit of employment
arbitration agreements comport with procedural due process, in theory and in practice. To
achieve widespread adoption, the judiciary needs to proactively endorse arbitration as a viable
alternative to litigation. Judging by the impact to date of Circuit City v. Adams and its progeny,
expanding the FAA’s reach fails to go far enough. What is needed, in addition, is a courtsanctioned model through which courts and arbitrators can work together to minimize judicial
backlog and maximize results. Employment disputes are a good starting point for realizing these
goals and objectives.
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